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Drivers for Livestock-Associated 
Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus 
Aureus Spread Among Danish Pig 
Herds - A Simulation Study
Jana Schulz  , Anette Boklund, Nils Toft & Tariq Halasa  
To gain insight into the rapid increase in the number of livestock-associated Methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (LA-MRSA)-positive herds in Denmark, we developed an individual-based Monte 
Carlo simulation model. We aimed to assess whether transmission of LA-MRSA via pig movements could 
explain the observed increase in the number of positive herds in Denmark, and to evaluate the effect of 
other between-herd transmission mechanisms. Pig movements alone were not sufficient to mimic the 
observed increase in LA-MRSA-positive herds in Denmark in any of the modelled scenarios. The model 
identified three factors that played important roles in the between-herd spread of LA-MRSA: (1) the 
within-herd dynamics, (2) the frequency and effectiveness of indirect transmissions, and (3) unexplainable 
introduction of LA-MRSA to swine herds. These factors can act as starting points for the development of 
LA-MRSA control programs in pig herds in order to limit the risk of its transmission to humans.
Staphylococcus aureus (S. aureus) is a ubiquitous bacterium in humans and animals, and a common cause of 
minor skin infections that do not usually require treatment. However, both S. aureus and Methicillin-resistant S. 
aureus (MRSA), which is resistant to beta-lactam antimicrobials, can lead to severe infections that could result 
in death, especially in individuals with a suppressed immune status. Livestock-associated MRSA (LA-MRSA) 
was first described in the Netherlands in 2005, and a special clonal complex, CC398, was identified shortly after1. 
LA-MRSA has been found in humans, pigs and other animal species since 20052–9. In 2006, the pathogen was 
found in isolates originating from Danish pig farms10. A survey conducted in 26 European countries by the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in 2008 found 3% of Danish production herds, but no Danish breeding 
herds, positive for LA-MRSA type CC3982. However, a national survey conducted in 2014 found a prevalence of 
63% in breeding herds and 68% in slaughter pig herds11. LA-MRSA has received enormous media attention due 
to its zoonotic potential, both in Denmark and beyond the borders.
Danish pig production has a pyramidal structure12,13. LA-MRSA-positive breeding sites at the top of the pyr-
amid pose a risk of spreading the pathogen via pig movements to production sites in the centre and down to 
sites like slaughterhouses at the bottom of the pyramid. Several studies have indicated that the transmission of 
LA-MRSA via animal movements is one of the main drivers for its spread among pig herds14–16. Other trans-
mission routes described are: air, housing environment, rodents, companion animals, vehicles and humans17–23. 
Understanding the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds is essential to developing meaningful control programs 
for the pig production sector. The main goal of action plans made by the Danish authorities is to reduce the num-
ber of LA-MRSA-positive pigs and herds, thereby reducing the risk of transmission to humans.
Simulation models are widely used as a way to inform decision making. They present an opportunity to test 
a hypothesis without experiments or in cases where experimental studies are not possible24,25. They cover a wide 
range of applications such as modelling the within-host infection dynamics, disease-spread modelling within or 
between populations, and evaluating control strategies to support decision makers in the control of infectious dis-
eases24. Since EU regulations require identification and registration of animals and animal movements26, data are 
available on a large scale and can be used as input in disease-spread models. Furthermore, if a pathogen is mainly 
spread through animal movements, the movement data can be used retrospectively to investigate its spread.
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An individual-based Monte Carlo simulation model of the spread of LA-MRSA within and between pig herds 
was developed, integrating available data on Danish pig herds and registered pig movements among these herds. 
The purpose was to examine what might have influenced the rapid spread of LA-MRSA among Danish pig herds 
during the period 2006 to 2015. The aims were to: (1) assess whether transmission of LA-MRSA via registered pig 
movements alone could account for the observed increase in prevalence in Denmark, and (2) evaluate the effect 
of other transmission mechanisms. The results should assist in creating an agenda for the control of LA-MRSA 
in Danish pig herds.
Materials and Methods
Data background for the simulation model (input data). In Denmark, information on pig holdings 
and pig movements are registered in the Central Husbandry Register (CHR)27, which is owned by the Ministry 
of Environment and Food. A dataset containing information on 18,648 pig herds and 7,678,851 movements 
among pig herds in Denmark was extracted for the study period 1st January 2006 to 31st December 2015. The 
dataset is described in detail by Schulz et al.13, and data preparation for the simulation model is described in the 
Supplementary Information. Several herds could be owned by the same farmer and thus constitute one hold-
ing. The study was performed at herd level, but information on ownership was retained to aid the modelling of 
LA-MRSA spread among herds with the same owner.
Herds registered as: (1) breeding and multiplier herds (breeding sites), (2) production herds, organic or 
free-range pig herds (merged into one category) and weaner herds (production sites), and (3) hobby herds (hobby 
sites) were used in our analysis, as well as the respective movements among these herds. End-of-production 
sites (e.g. 133 herds registered as slaughterhouses and 2,961,979 movements to slaughterhouses) were excluded 
because it was assumed that there would be no spread of pathogens back into the production chain from these. 
The remaining herd types and respective movements (2,657 herds and 116,386 movement records) were excluded 
because it was assumed they would have little impact on LA-MRSA spread due to the low number of registered 
herds and pig movements (e.g. zoo, experimental facilities) or because of missing information on the herd struc-
ture and age group of moved pigs (e.g. traders, trade herds). Any movements for which the number of pigs was 
not recorded were excluded (5,595 movement records). This left 49 herds that never moved pigs, and these were 
also excluded. In total, 12,874 herds and 993,474 movements were included in our study. If a herd changed its 
holding type to one not included in this study, the herd was assumed to be closed for the considered year, but kept 
active in the model for all other years.
LA-MRSA screening results in Danish pig herds. In 2008, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 
conducted an LA-MRSA survey in 26 European countries2. In subsequent years, national Danish surveys reported 
a rapid increase in the prevalence of LA-MRSA in breeding herds and slaughter pig herds11 (Table 1).
Simulation model. An individual-based Monte Carlo simulation model for the spread of LA-MRSA among 
pig herds was developed (Fig. 1). Information on pig herds and movement data were read from input files at the 
beginning of each simulation run. After LA-MRSA was initialised, three processes within each time step were 
modelled to simulate within-herd dynamics, transmission via pig movements and indirect transmission among 
herds. For each simulation repetition and on each simulated day, information on positive herds was stored in files 
for later interpretation.
Model initialisation. In the first step, information on herds and movement data was sourced. Four additional 
files were read by the model, and these contained: (1) simulation parameters (Table 2); (2) minimum, most likely 
(mode) and maximum values defining probability distributions (PERT distributions) for transmission and cure 
rates (Supplementary Information, Table S5); (3) a distance matrix containing the distances between all herds; 
(4) distance probabilities of contact among herds for the different types of contacts (Supplementary Information, 
Table S6).
In the next step, a herd matrix was generated containing the following information for each herd: (1) an indi-
vidual identification number (1–12,874); (2) the herd type registered in the CHR in 2006, set to zero for herds 
that were inactive (i.e. no movements registered) in 2006; (3) the simulated LA-MRSA status (equal to zero); (4) 
the number of sows, weaners and finishers registered (or estimated numbers as described in the Supplementary 
Information); (5) the number of LA-MRSA-positive sows, weaners and finishers (equal to zero); (6) status of 
antimicrobial usage based on the herd information (Supplementary Information); (7) transmission rates; (8) 
cure rates. Transmission and cure rates were randomly chosen from PERT distributions for each herd based on 
information from the literature28 (Supplementary Information, Table S5).
To initialise LA-MRSA in the simulation, it was necessary to define the number of herds and the herd types 
where LA-MRSA would be seeded. Additionally, the number of LA-MRSA-positive pigs and the age group of the 
first LA-MRSA cases were set. In the selected herds, ten LA-MRSA-positive sows were initialised. If fewer than ten 
sows were available, LA-MRSA was initiated in the weaner or finisher section. Several scenarios to mimic differ-
ent situations in 2006 and different introductions at later points in time were tested (Supplementary Information, 
Table S7). In 2006, LA-MRSA was seeded exclusively in large herds (number of sows, weaners and finishers above 
thsmall), whereas when it was initialised in later years, small herds could also randomly be chosen.
The model simulated daily time steps, while the herd matrix was updated on a yearly basis, e.g. herd type, 
number of animals and antimicrobial usage were updated according to the input data. Transmission and cure 
rates were only updated if the herd type changed between two consecutive years. The number of positive animals 
in each age group was calculated for the next year based on the prevalence in the previous year. If the herd type 
changed between years, the LA-MRSA status and number of positive sows, weaners and finishers was set to zero, 
with the assumption that cleaning and disinfection were carried out before changing the herd type.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Modelling disease spread within a herd. The following processes were implemented and used in the order they 
are described:
 (1) Environment-related recurrence. For herds that had previously been LA-MRSA positive but had no LA-MR-
SA-positive pigs on the simulation day (due to self-cleaning or selling all positive pigs), the LA-MRSA 
status of the herd was set to negative in the model. Nevertheless, depending on the time since the status 
changed to negative, an exponentially decreasing probability of one pig reverting to LA-MRSA positive 
status due to environmental contamination was simulated (Supplementary Information).
If the herd type changed between two consecutive years, this recurrence due to environmental contamina-
tion was still possible.
 (2) Self-cleaning of individual pigs. In positive herds, pigs could clear themselves randomly at any time 
according to the cure rates for sows, weaners and finishers within the herd (Supplementary Information, 
Table S5).
 (3) Within-herd dynamics. A three-compartment within-herd model was implemented with transmission 
within the three compartments and high- and low-risk transmission routes between the compartments for 
sows, weaners and finishers (Fig. 2). Homogenous mixing within each compartment was assumed. High-
risk transmission was assumed between subsequent compartments within the production line to mimic 
LA-MRSA transmission due to pig movements within the herd. A lower risk of LA-MRSA transmission 
was assumed in the opposite direction to the production line, representing indirect transmission mecha-
nisms e.g. via humans or equipment.
The transmission parameters published by Broens et al.28 (Supplementary Information, Table S5) take into 
account the pen structure in the compartments, which was not reflected in our model. The development 
of the within-herd prevalence in the first year after initialisation of LA-MRSA therefore showed a rapid 
increase (Supplementary Information, Figures S1–S4). In order to slow down the within-herd spread to 
reflect pen structure, a time-dependent shifting function was introduced (as described in Equation 5 in the 
Year [reference] Description
Number of tested 
herds
Estimated LA-MRSA 
prevalence in %
[95% confidence interval]
20082
Five dust samples were collected from the 
immediate environment of breeding pigs in the 
herd then pooled and tested for LA-MRSA
95 breeding herds:
198 production herds:
0.0 [0.0–3.2]
3.5 [1.8–7.1]
201039 Pools of five nasal swab samples were taken from five slaughter pigs in five different pens
99 herds with 
slaughter pigs: 16.2 [9.5–24.9]
201140 Pools of five nasal swab samples were taken from five slaughter pigs in five different pens
79 herds with 
slaughter pigs: 16.5 [9.1–26.5]
201411 Pools of five nasal swabs per herd 70 breeding herds:205 production herds:
63.0 [50.5–74.1]  
68.0 [60.9–74.1]
Table 1. Overview of LA-MRSA screenings performed in Danish pig herds between 2008 and 2014.
Figure 1. Overview of the structure of the livestock-associated Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
model.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Supplementary Information), representing the speed and steepness of LA-MRSA spread as modelled by 
Sørensen et al.29.
In herds with fewer than a certain number of animals (default value:thsmall = 200), only one compartment 
was modelled and homogeneous mixing was assumed. No time-dependent shifting was used for the trans-
mission rates in small herds. Supplementary Information Figure S5 shows the within-herd prevalence in 
production herds with fewer than 200 animals for (a) transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.28 and 
(b) time-shifted transmission rates for (1) herds using high-risk antibiotics, and (2) herds not using high-
risk antibiotics.
All subsequent scenarios were run with time-shifted transmission rates adapted based on Broens et al.28 
and Sørensen et al.29.
Modelling disease spread among herds. Spread via animal movements: Danish movement data do not include 
information on the age group of pigs moved between herds. As differences in prevalence can be expected among 
age groups, it was necessary to define movement types reflecting the age groups for each movement. The move-
ment types were based on the number of registered sows, weaners and finishers in both the sending and receiving 
herd (Supplementary Information).
Transmission via pig movements was included based on the movement data and types. The number of 
LA-MRSA-positive pigs that were moved to the receiving herd was calculated using a binomial process represent-
ing the total number of pigs that were moved and the prevalence within the source compartment. The herd size 
in both sending and receiving herds was kept constant, with the assumption that whenever pigs were moved in, a 
similar number of pigs were moved out. However, the number of LA-MRSA-positive pigs was updated on a daily 
basis for both herds. If there were no weaners registered in the sending herd, but the age group of pigs moved out 
of this herd was estimated to be weaners, the prevalence in the sow section was used. Nevertheless, the number of 
positive sows in this section was not updated.
Spread via indirect contacts: Other transmission routes such as vehicles (feeding and abattoir trucks) and 
humans (veterinarians, technicians and visitors) were pooled as indirect contacts among herds.
Two pathways of indirect transmission were modelled: (1) distance-dependent transmission from 
LA-MRSA-positive herds via e.g. humans moving between farms, and (2) transmission related to abattoir move-
ments. Indirect transmission related to human and abattoir movements was restricted to contacts within the same 
day of visits to several herds. For each LA-MRSA-positive herd h, the number of indirect contacts was calculated 
Variable 
name Default value Description Reference
Modelling disease spread within a herd
Environment-related recurrence
   envir 1 Switch on/off environment-related recurrence within-herd (0/1)
   αenvir 2.5 α in probability function for environment-related recurrence Within-herd module validation
Within-herd dynamics
   tds 1 Switch on/off time-dependent scaling of within-herd transmission
   x 50 Midpoint s-shape transmission curve Within-herd module validation
   k 0.05 Steepness of s-shape transmission curve Within-herd module validation
   hm 1 Switch on/off homogeneous mixing in small herds (0/1)
   thsmall 200
Herds sizes below or equal to thsmall are categorised as small herds 
– indicating random mixing within herd Assumption
Modelling disease spread among herds
Spread via indirect contacts
   ic 1 Switch on/off transmission via indirect contacts (0/1)
   λin 0.256
Average daily probability of indirect contact originating from an 
LA-MRSA-positive indoor herd Adjusted based on Boklund et al.
41
   λout 0.1864
Average daily probability of indirect contact originating from an 
LA-MRSA-positive outdoor herd Adjusted based on Boklund et al.
41
   probin
PERT
(min = 0.001,
max = 0.01,
mode = 0.005071)
Probability of infection via contact from an LA-MRSA-positive 
indoor herd Expert opinion
   probout
PERT
(min = 0.001,
max = 0.01,
mode = 0.0035)
Probability of infection via contact from an LA-MRSA-positive 
outdoor herd Expert opinion
   proba
PERT
(min = 0.001,
max = 0.01,
mode = 0.004714)
Probability of infection via abattoir movements Expert opinion
Table 2. Overview of simulation parameters and default values. PERT distributions were defined as 
transformation of the Beta distribution with minimum (min), maximum (max) and most likely value (mode) 
and a mean µ = + ⋅ +min mode max4
6
.
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based on a Poisson distribution using λin, λout, or λa
h. It was determined whether each indirect contact was effec-
tive based on the PERT distributions Probin, Probout or Proba, given in the input file (Table 2). In the case of an 
effective indirect contact, a herd was randomly chosen based on the read-in distance probability tables 
(Supplementary Information, Table S6).
In addition, transmission among herds with the same owner was modelled to represent shared workers or 
equipment (Supplementary Information).
Validation and convergence. The model was internally validated using three methods30: (1) face validity – using 
flow charts to ask people with an insight into the system whether the conceptual model was reasonable (Fig. 1, 
Figures S4–S8), and in the case of within-herd validation, whether the within-compartment prevalence repre-
sented a meaningful range, (2) the tracing method - following individual herds over time to determine whether 
the logic was correct, and (3) sensitivity analysis - evaluating the effect of changes in the fixed parameters. In 
addition, external validation was conducted by comparing the predicted prevalence of LA-MRSA by the model to 
the observed prevalence of LA-MRSA from the screening results in Danish swine herds (Table 1).
We assessed the number of simulation repetitions required before the variance in the total number of 
LA-MRSA-positive herds stabilised on 31st December 2015 (Supplementary Information, Figure S9). Although 
convergence was reached after 250 iterations, the model was run with 500 iterations per scenario to cover any 
extra variability in the different initialisation scenarios and in the sensitivity analysis.
A sensitivity analysis was performed based on a scenario in which LA-MRSA was initialised in 100 active large 
production herds on 1st January 2006, as well as one breeding and multiplier herd and 100 production herds on 1st 
January 2009. The model was run with different settings (e.g. without environment-related recurrence, Table 3) 
and all fixed parameters were halved and doubled (Table 3). The effects of changes were evaluated by changes in 
the within-herd dynamics and the total number of infected herds 10 years after the first initialisation of LA-MRSA
Data processing, simulation modelling and graphical presentation of results were performed in R version 
3.2.2 - “Fire Safety”31.
Results
Animal movements alone (initialisation scenarios). To assess whether the transmission of LA-MRSA 
via pig movements alone could account for the observed pattern of increased prevalence in Denmark, the model 
was run with 17 initialisation scenarios (Supplementary Information, Table S7). Based on the assumption that 
LA-MRSA was already established in 2006, five scenarios were set up which introduced LA-MRSA in varying 
quantities of breeding and multiplier and/or production herds in 2006. Additionally, in 12 scenarios, LA-MRSA 
was introduced at later points in time to mimic new introductions. The simulated proportion of LA-MRSA-positive 
holdings in 2008 and 2014 was compared to the observed results of LA-MRSA screenings performed in Denmark 
(Table 1). In all scenarios, LA-MRSA was initialised on 1st January 2006 in a number of breeding and multiplier 
herds and/or production herds (Supplementary Information, Table S7). Furthermore, scenarios were initiated to 
mimic further introduction of LA-MRSA in subsequent years. The predicted prevalence in breeding and multi-
plier herds matched the results of LA-MRSA screenings performed in Danish pig herds in 2008 (Table 1), but was 
lower than the observed prevalence in 2014 (Fig. 3). Animal movements could explain the observed prevalence in 
production herds in 2008 for certain scenarios, for example when the spread was initiated in many herds in 2006, 
or combined with initialisation in breeding herds. However, none of the scenarios could explain the observed prev-
alence in 2014 using animal movements alone (Fig. 3 and Supplementary Information, Figure S6.).
Animal movements and indirect contacts (initialisation scenarios). In the next step, all initial-
isation scenarios were run using pig movements and indirect contacts as transmission mechanisms and the 
between-herd prevalence on 31st December 2015 was compared. In all scenarios, the modelled prevalence was 
higher when indirect contacts were added, compared to simulations in which transmission was modelled via 
animal movements alone (data not shown).
In seven of the initialisation scenarios, the simulated median prevalence in breeding and multiplier herds as 
well as in production herds overlapped with the confidence interval of the LA-MRSA screening results for Danish 
pig herds in 2008 (Fig. 4). The median of five of the mentioned scenarios overlapped with the 2014 screening 
results for breeding and multiplier herds (Fig. 4b). However, for production herds, the median of only one sce-
nario overlapped with the 2014 LA-MRSA screening results, whereas the median prevalence in 2008 exceeded 
the observed screening results (Fig. 4). The violin plots overlapped with the screening results for breeding and 
Figure 2. Schematic description of the implemented within-herd LA-MRSA spread.
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multiplier herds as well as for production herds in both 2008 and 2014 in eight initialisation scenarios, indicating 
that these scenarios might represent the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds between 2006 and 2014.
Sensitivity analysis. Based on the results, a default scenario of LA-MRSA initialisation in 100 production 
herds in 2006, and in one breeding and multiplier and 100 production herds in 2009 was used for the sensitivity 
analysis. The results of the scenarios with varied parameters were compared to the predicted median prevalence 
of the default scenario to allow the evaluation of the effects of parameter variation.
Scenarios relating to within-herd dynamics had a large impact on the model outcome. Running the model 
without time-dependent scaling of the transmission rates (NoTDS), and with halved midpoint (Mid_h) or dou-
bled steepness (Steep_d) of the time-scaling function resulted in a higher prevalence compared to the standard 
scenario (Fig. 5). The modelled prevalence in the scenarios Mid_h and Steep_d fitted the LA-MRSA screen-
ing results from 2014 better than the default scenario. However, the modelled results for 2008 were above the 
LA-MRSA screening results. Compared to the default scenario, reducing the within-herd transmission by dou-
bling the midpoint or halving the steepness of the time-scaling function decreased the modelled prevalence for 
breeding and multiplier herds and production herds for both years.
Scenarios representing environment-related recurrence (NoEnvir, Envir_h, Envir_d) and homogeneous mix-
ing in small herds (NoHM, THhm_h, THhm_d) showed only small variations in the modelled outcome com-
pared to the default scenario (Fig. 5).
Simulations that only modelled one of the implemented indirect transmission routes also resulted in a lower 
prevalence compared to the default scenario. Nevertheless, doubling (1) the average daily probability of indirect 
contact originating from an LA-MRSA-positive herd (variables λin and λout, scenario FreqICin/out_d) or (2) the 
probability of infection via indirect contact from an LA-MRSA-positive herd (variables Probin and Probout, sce-
nario ProbICin/out_d) led to an increased simulated prevalence in 2008 and 2014 compared to the default scenario, 
as well as an overlap with the LA-MRSA screening results from 2014.
Violin plots for 2010 and 2011 are shown in Supplementary Information, Figure S8.
Discussion
Livestock movements have been described as a driving factor in the spread of LA-MRSA, and the restriction of 
trade from MRSA-positive to MRSA-negative herds has therefore been discussed in the literature as a potential 
control option32. In order to assess whether a ban on animal movements would impede LA-MRSA spread, it is 
important to understand the extent to which it affects transmission. In the present study, the spread of LA-MRSA 
among pig herds via animal movements alone and via animal movements combined with indirect contact among 
pig herds was simulated to evaluate the effect of the modelled transmission routes. Several initialisation and 
Acronym Description Values
Modelling disease spread within a herd
Environment-related recurrence
NoEnvir No environment-related recurrence within-herd envir = 0
Envir Variation of αenvir α ∈ .{1 25, 5}envir
Within-herd dynamics
NoTDS No time-dependent shifting of within-herd transmission tds = 0
Mid Variation of x ∈x {25, 75}
Steep Variation of k ∈ . .k {0 025, 0 1}
NoHM No homogeneous mixing in small herds hm = 0
THhm Variation of thsmall ∈th {100, 400}small
Modelling disease spread among herds
Spread via indirect contacts
NoIC No indirect contacts ic = 0
ICin/out
Only distance-dependent indirect contact for indoor and 
outdoor herds
ICa Only indirect contact related to abattoir movements
ICsw Only indirect contact related to herds with the same owner
FreqICin/out Variation of λi and λo
λ ∈ . .{0 128, 0 512}i
λ ∈ . .{0 0932, 0 3728}o
ProbICin/out Variation of Probin and Probout
∈ . . .Prob PERT{ (0 0005, 0 005, 0 0025355),in
. . .PERT(0 002, 0 02, 0 010142)}
∈ . . .Prob PERT{ (0 0005, 0 005, 0 00175),out
. . .PERT(0 002, 0 02, 0 007)}
ProbICa Variation of Proba
∈ . . .Prob PERT{ (0 0005, 0 005, 0 002357),a
. . .PERT(0 002, 0 02, 0 009428)}
Table 3. Overview of scenarios run in the framework of the sensitivity analysis. All default values (Table 2) 
were halved and doubled. For PERT distributions (probin, probout, proba), minimum, mode and maximum values 
were halved and doubled.
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sensitivity analysis scenarios were run and the results compared to the outcome of LA-MRSA screenings per-
formed in Danish pig herds to externally validate the model and to evaluate the influence of the used model 
parameters on the model prediction. Based on assumptions in the model, pig movements alone cannot account 
for the spread of LA-MRSA in Denmark for the period 2006 to 2014. Even extensive initialisation in 2006 and 
subsequent years did not lead to the increase in LA-MRSA prevalence observed in Danish pig herds. Therefore, 
it is likely that a prevention strategy including only a ban on animal movements would not have prevented the 
spread of LA-MRSA among Danish pig herds.
Three routes were included to mimic the transmission of LA-MRSA via indirect contact: (1) human con-
tacts, (2) abattoir movements, and (3) same owner. Modelling indirect contact clearly showed that the model 
was able to represent the observed prevalence in 2008, but showed lower predicted prevalence compared to that 
observed in 2014 for the default scenario (Fig. 4). Still, the figure clearly demonstrates the importance of indi-
rect contact in the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds compared to modelling the spread using only animal 
movements (Figs 3 and 4). The sensitivity analysis on the frequency and risk associated with indirect contact also 
showed its influential impact on the spread of LA-MRSA (Fig. 5). An LA-MRSA control program must therefore 
include biosecurity measures to limit the spread of LA-MRSA among herds via indirect contact. However, even 
though literature describing these transmission routes does exist21,33,34, detailed information on the frequency 
and effectiveness of LA-MRSA transmission via these indirect routes is lacking. As parameters related to indirect 
Figure 3. Herd prevalence in breeding and multiplier herds (a,b) and production herds (c,d) on 31st December 
2008 and 31st December 2014 resulting from simulated LA-MRSA transmission via pig movements only, based 
on 500 iterations. Time-shifted transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.28 were used. The horizontal black 
line and grey area mark the observed prevalence and 95% confidence interval of the LA-MRSA screenings 
performed in Danish swine herds in 2008 and 2014. Example acronyms: 06.b5p200 – initialisation in five 
breeding and multiplier herds and 200 production herds in 2006, 06.b5_07-09.p200 – initialisation in five 
breeding and multiplier herds in 2006 and 200 production herds each year from 2007 to 2009.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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transmission routes were shown to be relevant for LA-MRSA spread among pig holdings, more knowledge should 
be gained to reduce uncertainties in the model outcome.
The model was initiated with many scenarios in an attempt to generate situations that would mimic the 
observed prevalence. The scenarios in which LA-MRSA was only initiated in herds in 2006 did not mimic the 
observed prevalence (Fig. 4). Nevertheless, randomly infecting herds in subsequent years resulted in an overlap 
between the some of the scenarios and the observed prevalence, indicating that the model is capable of replicat-
ing the LA-MRSA epidemic in Denmark between 2006 and 2014. As it is not possible to know exactly which (if 
any) of the modelled scenarios corresponded to reality, it can be difficult to choose the best scenario for future 
modelling of control measures. However, several scenarios can be modelled to identify the most effective strategy 
in different situations.
The fact that LA-MRSA had to be initialised in many herds over time suggests that it could not have spread 
solely via the simulated processes in this study (namely animal movements and indirect contacts), but that other 
processes must also have contributed. Humans can be persistent carriers of S. aureus and therefore be colonised 
for longer time periods35. In addition, humans working at or visiting a known LA-MRSA-positive herd might 
carry the pathogen for some time36 and might be able to transmit it to pigs in other visited herds. Therefore, 
the unexplained introduction of LA-MRSA to pig herds over time could represent introductions via humans. 
Figure 4. Herd prevalence in breeding and multiplier herds (a,b) and production herds (c,d) on 31st December 
2008 and 31st December 2014 resulting from simulated LA-MRSA transmission via pig movements and indirect 
contacts, based on 500 iterations. Time-shifted transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.28 were used. 
The horizontal black line and grey area mark the observed prevalence and 95% confidence interval of the LA-
MRSA screenings performed in Danish swine herds in 2008 and 2014. Black violins mark scenarios in which 
the simulated median prevalence in breeding and multiplier herds and production herds overlapped with the 
confidence interval of the LA-MRSA screening results. Example acronyms: 06.b5p200 – initialisation in five 
breeding and multiplier herds and 200 production herds in 2006, 06.b5_07-09.p200 – initialisation in five 
breeding and multiplier herds in 2006 and 200 production herds each year from 2007 to 2009.
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LA-MRSA could have been spread locally via for example, air, companion animals or rodents. However, to the 
best of our knowledge, there are no studies providing quantification of LA-MRSA transmission through these 
routes, and they were therefore not incorporated into the model framework.
Results of the sensitivity analysis showed that the parameters representing the within-herd spread of 
LA-MRSA had a substantial impact on model predictions (Fig. 5). This indicated that the within-herd prevalence 
could affect the between-herd prevalence and that reducing the prevalence within a herd might help to control 
LA-MRSA spread. This can be used as a starting point to study the impact of reducing the within-herd prevalence, 
for example by reducing antibiotic usage, and/or imposing higher biosecurity in a national control program.
Real data on pig herds and movements registered in the CHR were used as background data for the simula-
tion27. Although the CHR provides very detailed data, it was necessary to estimate the age groups of moved pigs 
and, in some cases, the number of animals in a certain age group on the farm. Obligatory registration of the age 
of moved pigs in the CHR and automatic cross-validation between registers would increase the accuracy and 
validity of data in general as well as the accuracy of the results from this study.
It was necessary to exclude all trade herds due to missing information on the structure of the trade facilities. 
As there is no individual identification system for pigs, it was impossible to identify how long pigs might have 
been owned by traders or how they were mixed, thus potentially spreading LA-MRSA. However, there are very 
few trade herds in Denmark13 and this was therefore considered to be of limited importance.
Only one study simulating the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds was found in the literature37. This study 
was conducted on pig herds in Denmark and it found that movement-induced transmission alone could yield a 
high probability of LA-MRSA persistence at a very low prevalence. However, the study used restricted movement 
Figure 5. Sensitivity analysis showing the effect of changing the input for herd prevalence in breeding and 
multiplier herds (a,b) and production herds (c,d). Based on prevalence on 31st December 2008 and 31st 
December 2014 in 500 iterations. Time-shifted transmission rates adapted from Broens et al.28 were used. The 
horizontal black line and grey area mark the observed prevalence and 95% confidence interval of the LA-MRSA 
screenings performed in Danish swine herds in 2008 and 2014.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
1 0SCIeNTIfIC REPORTS |         (2018) 8:16962  | DOI:10.1038/s41598-018-34951-1
data from only 1 year and did not include within-herd dynamics, which appeared to be influential in our study. 
In addition, indirect contact was modelled implicitly, without modelling the frequency or associated risk, and the 
impact of indirect contact on LA-MRSA spread was therefore not studied.
Besides individual-based Monte Carlo simulation models, also population-based models exist25,38. However, 
these population-based models simulate groups of individuals (herds), and actions such as pig movements or 
indirect contacts between herds would be applied to all herds in a certain group at the same time, which is not 
realistic. In contrast, individual-based models allow tracing of individual herds over time providing better insight 
into the modelled processes.
The model was developed to gain better insight into the spread of LA-MRSA among pig herds. However, 
it could be adapted to mimic the transmission of other pathogens that can be shed without clinical signs in 
pigs such as Salmonella. These pathogens could also be transmitted via animal movements and indirect contacts 
among pig herds. In addition, the model can also be used to simulate the spread of LA-MRSA in other farmed 
animal species. When applying the model to other pathogens or animal species, it may require adaptation accord-
ing to the modelled disease or system. Modules mimicking other transmission pathways than the already imple-
mented could be easily added to the original model.
In future, this model can be used to test control options to limit the spread of LA-MRSA. The effects of e.g. 
trade restrictions, as well as constraints related to indirect contact among herds could be evaluated to assist deci-
sion makers adapt local action plans. Additionally, the impact of increasing internal biosecurity and attempts 
to reduce antimicrobial usage at herd level could be evaluated. This could lead to the establishment of potential 
thresholds below which the within-herd prevalence would have to remain in order to have a clear impact on the 
between-herd spread of LA-MRSA.
Code availability. The R script can be obtained from the authors upon request.
Data Availability
Data are owned by a third party. The authors had no special access privileges to these data. Danish pig movement 
data can be obtained for a fee by ordering an extract from https://chr.fvst.dk and by contacting the CGI Service 
Desk, tel. +45 70 21 13 21 or e-mailing dk-support.dk@cgi.com.
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